In the devastating triple train accident in Odisha’s Balasore recently, which claimed 288 lives and injured more than 1,000 people, the Coromandel Shalimar Express, running at 128 kmph, and the YesvantpurHowrah Superfast, at 126 kmph, were nearing the speed limit of 130 kmph. Though speed won’t be a subject of inquiry — as none of the trains was overspeeding — this deadly episode should be seen as an amber signal to the transport behemoth that it must continue its journey carefully, and speed up only with safety gears on.
How did the accident in Odisha occur?
On June 2, an accident involving three trains — two passenger trains and one freight train — took place in Balasore in Odisha. At around 7 pm, the Coromandel Shalimar Express, heading to Chennai and running at 128 kmph, moved toward the loop line instead of taking the main line and crashed into a stationary freight train. The freight train, carrying iron ores, was like a hard wall, and the impact of the crash was enormous, forcing the Coromandel express to derail. Some coaches flew off to another track and hit the last two coaches of the Yesvantpur-Howrah Superfast that was coming from the opposite direction.
Was it a human or machine error?
While a CBI investigation is on and the exact reason of the accident is not yet public, railway officers in the know have ruled out any error on the part of the loco driver or trackman. The Coromandel express driver, they say, received the green signal, meaning the train was to go on the main line but the train automatically entered the loop line. A loop line is a branch line that leaves the main line and rejoins it after a short distance, and any train entering it invariably gets the yellow signal, indicating that the driver needs to proceed cautiously.
Railway Board member Jaya Verma Sinha said in a presser on June 4 that the driver, when he was still conscious, disclosed that he had received the green signal. He succumbed to his injuries later. It is suspected that the setting of the point machine, a device that enables trains to change track, was changed. That means someone in charge of maintenance committed a grave mistake in the standard protocol. Only an investigation will establish whether it was a mistake due to negligence or lack of training, or whether it was a sabotage. At this juncture, it appears the signal failure was due to human intervention.
What’s a railway relay room and why was it the first port of entry for investigators?
A relay room is a special room adjacent to the station master’s room filled with S&T (signalling and telecommunication) equipment. It relays information electrically. The room contains relays (a type of device) for various forms of signalling, and is double-locked, which means two officials will have a key each. In this particular accident, as the signal light and the direction of the train do not match, it is suspected that the crash originated in this room. Investigators will have to find out who all were present in the last round of repair or maintenance work, and who tampered with the system and if it was by design.
Did back luck play a role in making a bad accident worse?
As the Coromandel Express, at full speed, rammed into a goods train weighed down with iron ore, it was bound to be a devastating accident. But many lives would have been saved had its coaches not hit the rear portion of the Yesvantpur Howrah Superfast coming at a speed of 126 kmph from the other side. Had the incident taken place half a minute later, the other train would have passed the area. But if the incident had happened 30-40 seconds earlier, the entire Yesvantpur Howrah train would have been damaged, making the accident far bigger than it is now.
Could the accident have been averted with Kavach?
Kavach is an indigenously developed train collision avoidance system meant for preventing accidents due to human error such as crossing the red signal and overspeeding. The system is designed to halt locomotives moving towards each other 380 metres apart. The section where the accident took place is not covered under Kavach. Even if the loco of the Coromandel Express had been fitted with Kavach, it would not have helped, say officials. When the setting in the Relay Room was wrong, no device would have worked perfectly. Also the train, once it entered the loop line, had a margin of just 50-60 metres before it hit the goods train, leaving no room for any mechanical manoeuvring.
What’s the sanctioned amount and the timeline for the rollout of Kavach?
This automatic train protection system is currently deployed only in 1,455 route km in South Central Railway, protecting 77 trains, according to a reply to a Rajya Sabha question in December 2022. Installation of Kavach worth Rs 13,000 crore has been sanctioned for 34,000 km. First priority are Delhi-Howrah and Delhi-Mumbai sections followed by other high density network (HDN) routes (about 11,000 route km in total) such as Mumbai Chennai, Howrah – Chennai, etc. According to the blueprint, the system will then be installed in highly used network (HUN) routes (about 23,000 route km). According to estimates, about 96% railway traffic is carried on HDN and HUN routes even though the Railways’ total route length is 68,103 km.
Were past accidents mostly the result of human or machine failure?
Past railway accident records suggest that mishaps take place mainly due to human error. In 2021-22, for instance, out of 34 consequential train accidents (with 9 deaths in total), 20 took place because of the railway staff ’s failure while four accidents were due to non-railway staff ’s negligence. Equipment failure caused only four accidents. There was one case of sabotage. Let’s take 2016-17, a year of high casualty, when 195 people were killed in 103 accidents. 86 accidents (83.4%) were due to human failure. Two accidents were acts of sabotage. Another two were due to machine failure. Other reasons were incidental factors and a combination of factors.
What is the most archaic practice prevalent in the rail safety mechanism in India?
Track maintainers (popularly called gangmen), who walk on the tracks to check their integrity, use an archaic method of bursting crackers to alert loco drivers when they spot a faulty track. When a gangman finds a crack on the track, he runs half a kilometre towards the side from where he anticipates the next train will come. He places a small, round cracker on the track, assuming that it will explode once the train runs over it, alerting the driver who will slow down. Drivers are not allowed to carry phones. Indian Railways has yet to deploy machines that video-graph the track to check its safety.
As India gears up to increase the speed of its trains, is it also looking at safety?
Indigenously developed Vande Bharat trains can run at a speed of 160 kmph. But at present that speed is allowed only in a part of the 200-km-long section between New Delhi and Agra. Gatiman Express has been running at this speed between these two cities, thanks to the deployment of European Train Control System Level-1. With the government giving its nod to develop over 1,000 Vande Bharat trains (21 have been manufactured and 18 deployed), India will soon have a huge capacity to run trains at this speed. An upgrade of Delhi-Howrah and DelhiMumbai routes, about 3,000 km in total, to run trains at 160 kmph, is likely to be over by the end of next year. The high-speed train corridor project (200 kmph-plus) under construction between Ahmedabad and Mumbai is not factored in here as it has access control and will follow all international safety protocols.
For the rest of the railway projects, speed has to go hand in hand with safety. Though the train collision avoidance system, Kavach, will be deployed before the Delhi Howrah and the Delhi-Mumbai sections are opened up for trains running at 160 kmph, investigators probing the Odisha crash must also look at other possible safety lapses that may occur in the future. As the recent accident has shown, Kavach can’t be the only shield for the Railways to ensure safety. It has to deploy a better fail-safe mechanism.
