Antonio Gramsci was astute when he observed that ‘every military fact is also a social and political fact’. Joe Biden is readying himself for an election year in 2024. Putin’s Russia doesn’t do democratic elections. But the Russian leader, too, is playing to his domestic, anti-West gallery. And war itself, with its ancillary industries, has its stakeholders in the military-industrial complex that straddles both sides of the conflict. Putin may chaff against Biden’s recent Kyiv visit, but the war has become geopolitics by other means. Putin prepares to welcome close ally Xi Jinping, even as US secretary of state Antony Blinken warns Beijing considering ‘lethal support’ to Moscow. In other words, there is no endgame in sight and no party – barring Ukraine – really wishing a swift end to the war.
On this deceptively chaotic landscape, India is in a difficult situation. It has been supportive of Ukraine, even as it has walked the tightrope in its dealings with Russia. But the balancing act is likely to get more difficult, especially as Russia’s room to support India against an aggressive and expansionist China gets progressively smaller. New Delhi has been a strident advocate for dialogue, negotiations and peace, pointing out that this – 2022 now rolling into 2023 – is ‘not the time for war’. As G20 president, India needs to carve out an approach that ensures global collaboration that drives home the real global liabilities of this grinding war.
