It won elections in 2006 and then just stayed on, sending out mixed signals on peace deals while still carrying out violent attacks. Incidentally, over the years, the adjustment and acceptance to Hamas also became the model of installing a Taliban government in Afghanistan. In many ways, these developments were the first signals of the US withdrawing from these conflict zones, allowing regional dynamics to take over.
In fact, at some point under different administrations over the past 15 years, the US reduced its footprint from East Asia, Europe and West Asia. All three have led to consequences, dragging Washington back to those theatres, just as it’s happening now with the deployment of aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean.
In East Asia, China sought to fill the vacuum by first advancing its claims in South China Sea, and then gradually securing them inch by inch, shoal by shoal. Through military assertiveness and economic coercion, China was able to achieve strategic pre-eminence in the region. To the extent that it did not even comply on an arbitration ruling under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against its claims and actions in Philippines. Eventually, the US had to rethink and return to East Asia with a new Indo-Pacific strategy. The China question also turned into a hot-button domestic political issue in America, making it the priority security subject until the Ukraine war exploded and divided Europe.
As the US turned its attention to China, it expected Europe to take care of its own affairs. Washington, in fact, wanted Europe to share a bigger burden on the security side that is heavily Nato-dependent. The Russian action on Ukraine, however, changed the picture substantially. Despite all the reluctance, Washington had to backstop Europe on strengthening Ukraine to put up a fight against the military might of Russia. The conflict has dragged on, as has US involvement.
Even Russia, the other great power to emerge from World War 2 before losing much of its global heft after the Cold War, retained a zone of influence in its extended neighbourhood. Which is why the war in Ukraine became a matter of prestige, even as its continuation has weakened Moscow in other ways. For years, Russia brokered the difficult transaction between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.In one audacious sweep last month, Azerbaijan took over the disputed Karabakh while Russia stood silent. The Collective Security and Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a Russia-led grouping of former Soviet states, ought to have been the platform for an Armenia Azerbaijan conversation. But it failed.Türkiye emerged the real gainer. It supported Azerbaijan, provided it with military equipment and drones that helped tilt the military balance against Armenia. Ankara has also fuelled an arms race between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as it seeks to reestablish the historical Turkish zone of influence in Central Asia. Azerbaijan’s control over Nagorno-Karabakh may help facilitate completion of the middle corridor along the ancient Silk Route physically reconnecting Türkiye to Central Asia and beyond.
If Russia is having to compromise elsewhere due to its prolonged commitment in Ukraine, another old great power, France, is diminishing as an influence in its traditional zone of influence in Central and North Africa. Infamously known as the ‘coup belt’, this area has broken all records in the last two years. About a dozen coups have taken place since 2021 in Mali, Sudan, Niger, Guinea, Gabon, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone, among other countries. Of these, five have taken place in the past six months, throwing the region into turmoil as French influence continues to wane amid a raging domestic debate on the issue.
So, the latest developments in West Asia, especially Hamas audacity, can be seen as part of a larger global trend where great powers are either abdicating strategic space or are being forced to fight for it. The UN Security Council is a divided house between two groups — US-Britain-France and Russia-China — among the five veto-privileged permanent members. With no consensus on most security issues, non-state actors are bound to get emboldened, taking the cue from countries like Türkiye to use the turmoil as an opportunity to settle old.
As for India, it needs to play its cards carefully. By most accounts, India will emerge as a net gainer from this global churn. But it needs to protect and preserve itself, choosing where to get involved and to what degree. New Delhi cannot insulate itself altogether. But it needs its security, intelligence and diplomatic apparatus on higher alert, to both anticipate threats and leverage opportunities. The task is easier said than done. Because a challenge, like the one that came from China in 2020, could emerge anywhere. Yet, if played well, India with a stable economy and polity could ride into the better side of this churn.
Views expressed are author’s own
