Most Canadians have no idea where the country’s spy agency is located, nor do they know much about its daily operations. This is not because the Canadian Security Intelligence Service operates in a particularly clandestine fashion, it’s because most Canadians don’t care.
The CSIS, a civilian-run organisation based in a triangular structure of concrete and glass on the outskirts of Ottawa, lacks the intrigue of Britain’s MI5 and the notoriety of America’s Central Intelligence Agency.
“I look nothing like Daniel Craig, and I did not arrive here in an Aston Martin. I’m just as disappointed as you are – on both fronts,” its director, David Vigneault, said in a speech in 2018, poking fun at the service’s largely uncharismatic reputation. “Most of you remember the movie Fight Club. And you will know that the first rule of Fight Club is ‘don’t talk about Fight Club’. Well, the first rule of CSIS has always been ‘don’t talk’. Period.”
But the operations of CSIS have become headline news after months of leaks of intelligence documents that suggest China has a sophisticated election interference network across Canada.
The allegations of Beijing’s meddling attempts have caused political turmoil and ruined at least two political careers. They have also put an uncomfortable spotlight on an organisation already grappling with allegations of a toxic work environment and deep internal rifts over its future.
When Vigneault appeared before parliament in early March, he lamented that the leaks were “very serious” and revealed the agency’s investigative methods and possibly its sources. Despite his frustration, the leaks have persisted.
In the months since intelligence documents were first shared with two Canadian media outlets, it remains unclear if the leaks are coming from within the agency or from disgruntled bureaucrats in the federal government who have access to CSIS documents.
The publicity-shy agency has remained largely silent as the political crisis has deepened.
“CSIS probably just really hopes this goes away as quickly as humanly possible. This is very, very bad for them,” said Jessica Davis, a former intelligence analyst at CSIS and the president of Insight Threat Intelligence, a consultancy. “They’re probably concerned about not adding fuel to the fire by saying something the leaker feels compelled to contradict with more information, more documents and more allegations.”
Created in 1984 in the wake of failures within Canada’s federal police agency, including allegations of illegal conduct, CSIS monitors threats to Canada’s national security, operating inside the country and abroad. It cannot detain or arrest people, and its intelligence cannot be used in prosecutions. It also diverges from allied nations’ agencies in how restrained it is when it comes to handling sensitive information.
“The joke about American intelligence is if you want to know what they’re thinking, just wait three days and you’ll see it in the New York Times. And British intelligence has long used leaking strategically. But in Canada, leaks are incredibly rare,” said Stephanie Carvin, an associate professor of international relations at Carleton University and a former national security analyst. “We have never dealt with a situation like this.”
The muted role of the agency in political culture, and the reality that intelligence has not typically influenced Canada’s foreign or national security policies, means little has trickled down into the public consciousness.
This lack of interest, however, has masked the lawsuits and legal condemnations of the agency. In 2017, CSIS was at the centre of a C$35m lawsuit, which it later settled, after it was accused of racism, homophobia and anti-Muslim discrimination. In a separate case, a staff member alleged bullying, discrimination, abuse and religious persecution, and his lawyer argued that CSIS was “broken”.
Amid the institutional tumult, the agency is facing a broader crisis of identity. In his 2018 speech, Vigneault suggested it required a dramatic shift in priorities from terrorism to foreign interference, calling the latter the “greatest threat to our prosperity and national interest”.
But the shift has required a deftness uncharacteristic of a large, bureaucratic agency, prompting frustrations from within that the necessary tools to combat foreign interference are lacking.
“When the CSIS mandate was written in 1984, the most sophisticated technology we had was a fax machine,” Carvin said. “The director has said, quite literally and on multiple occasions: ‘We can’t do our jobs any more.’ That’s how serious the problem has become.”
Increasingly, even those working on understanding the scope and nature of foreign interference have become frustrated with a perceived lack of urgency – from top brass at the agency and from political leaders.
“When I first became aware of the significance of the threat posed by outside interference to our democratic institutions, I worked – as have many unnamed and tireless colleagues – to equip our leaders with the knowledge and the tools needed to take action against it,” one of the anonymous leakers – described as a “national security official” – wrote in a recent Globe and Mail editorial.
“Months passed, and then years. The threat grew in urgency; serious action remained unforthcoming. I endeavored, alone and with others, to raise concerns about this threat directly to those in a position to hold our top officials to account. Regrettably, those individuals were unable to do so.”
As the nature of the leaks continues to rattle Canadian politics, the contents of the documents have already cost one lawmaker his role in the caucus of the governing Liberals and raised questions about how to interpret the allegations.
With some of the leaked documents more than two years old, some people possibly flagged by national security services might no longer be of interest, said Dennis Molinaro, a professor of legal studies at Ontario Tech University and a former national security analyst with the federal government.
But unlike law enforcement, the intelligence services will not acknowledge they are investigating someone or have done so in the past. “Acknowledging the existence of one investigation could burn or endanger something new,” he said. “The stuff we’re seeing in the media, if it’s true, is at best only a snapshot in time. It’s not reflective of the present. And so you could really damage people’s reputations.”
Molinaro continued: “Too many people are throwing theories around, but there’s so much we don’t know. The place to try and answer these questions, I’m sorry to say, is behind closed doors. The world of intelligence is closed and siloed off for a reason.”
