The writer is biosecurity policy manager at the Centre for Long-Term Resilience and a fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks
We need to get serious about biosecurity — and quickly. Biological risks have evolved dramatically in a short time, and governments need to act, both at home and together.
Advances in biotechnology have potentially made it easier to create or modify deadly pathogens, lowering the barriers for adversarial states and extremist organisations to develop biological weapons. Referring to the 2018 novichok attack in Salisbury, the UK’s integrated review has warned of a “realistic possibility” that terrorists will launch a successful chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack by 2030.
Meanwhile, high containment laboratories proliferate around the world as life science research expands, bringing increased likelihood of an accident involving dangerous pathogens. And as we have learned, naturally occurring outbreaks could become future pandemics, even more transmissible or deadly than Covid-19.
Whether through malign intent, human error or the evolution of viruses, we now face a range of heightened threats. Biosecurity needs to keep those charged with protecting our safety up at night.
The US has begun to recognise the risks. At the end of last year, the Prevent Pandemics Act was passed to bolster the country’s preparedness. The bipartisan legislation promises to enhance detection capabilities, bolster supply chains and accelerate medical countermeasure development. Senator Patty Murray, champion of the legislation, told Congress that “we are taking action so we never go through a crisis like this again”.
An Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy will be responsible for mitigation of biological threats across the federal government. The new unit will implement the national biodefence strategy, which includes developing early warning capabilities and investing in emerging technologies to deter state and non-state actors from developing biological weapons. Signalling the scale of the ambition, the strategy seeks $88bn of funding over five years.
In the UK, officials in the Cabinet Office’s national security secretariat are finalising a refresh of the 2018 national biological security strategy. While that plan recognised the range of biological risks the country faces, it provided few details on implementation or resources. Without clear accountability and sufficient funds, it’s perhaps no surprise that by the Covid-19 outbreak some 18 months later, the UK wasn’t nearly as well prepared as it should have been.
The new strategy is our best shot at rectifying this. It must include an implementation plan identifying who will tackle each risk, with a timeline for delivery. And its commitments must be properly funded. These are financially constrained times, but the £376bn cost of the pandemic in the UK shows the eye-watering consequences of failing to invest. The recent national resilience framework is at least one heartening sign that the government is starting to recognise the imperative of defence against extreme risks.
Finally, the UK needs to act in concert with others around the world to counter the risk of biological threats of every origin. The UK leads the world in metagenomic sequencing — this could offer the possibility of detecting new pathogens at the very beginning of an outbreak. We should pioneer the creation of an interconnected early warning system at home and, through artful diplomacy, drive development of a global system to sound the alarm on potential pandemics.
With a new cabinet facing so many challenges, ruthless prioritisation is needed to safeguard the UK’s economic wellbeing and national security. Biosecurity needs to be up there — delivered through an ambitious strategy and dogged implementation of its recommendations.
