Beijing will likely devote significant attention at UNGA 78 to the climate crisis and China’s response to it. China will reaffirm its commitments to achieving carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. China is expected to reiterate to the international audience the efforts it has taken since its initial submission of Nationally Determined Contributions in 2016. International forums like the UNGA give China a platform to speak about its domestic successes; for example, the country doubled its utility-scale solar and wind power capacity, a build-out that met the central government’s 1,200 gigawatt goal five years ahead of schedule. China relies on these types of achievements to bolster its positive image internationally and show progress on its commitments.
However, China will likely face scrutiny and, no doubt, some criticism at UNGA 78 for recent domestic climate-related policy choices. China will attempt to divert attention from its continued construction of new coal-fired power stations and increased reliance on coal broadly, instead focusing on other areas of climate progress that Beijing has prioritized. These include conserving biodiversity, meeting the global water and food crises, and increasing and preserving green spaces (such as reforestation). These are all transboundary issues that allow China to highlight the work it has done while calling upon greater international support. China’s international initiatives have shown that it has the potential to focus resources to help vulnerable and developing states. The same could be done in the climate space, where it has successfully increased its leadership in the years since President Donald Trump’s removal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in 2016 (before the United States rejoined under President Joe Biden in 2021).
One area that is still in the development stage for China is loss and damage financing. “Loss and damage” is a legal term that refers to economic and noneconomic losses linked to the impact of climate change, such as those attributable to extreme weather events or rising sea levels. At the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference or Conference of the Parties (COP27), a loss and damage fund was approved to be set up under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and a transitional committee of 24 countries began work to determine how the fund will be operationalized, who will benefit, and who will pay. Details of the committee’s recommendations will be released this year at COP28. Right now, however, there is no particular international leader backing the fund. China supported the creation of the fund but did not accept an obligation to contribute financially to it, given its status as a developing country and protection under the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle. However, with China seeking to play a greater leadership role within the international community and the United States expressing a view to limit the fund, this may provide an opportunity for China to take the lead. If so, China may signal such an intention during UNGA 78.
The loss and damage fund seems to primarily target “least developed countries” (LDCs), which currently number 48. This group includes 33 countries in Africa, 14 in Asia, and one in Latin America. Thus, the fund provides an opportunity that would dovetail with China’s attempts to strengthen its role and influence in the Global South. Taking the lead on loss and damage financing is not a guaranteed course of action for China, but, given its commitment to supporting the Global South and other vulnerable states, including LDCs, it may seize this unique opportunity for leadership at the UN.
Separately, but in line with China’s other climate-related actions and its growing engagement with international organizations, Beijing is likely to focus more on global food security. At the BRICS Summit, Xi boasted that China had “launched a China-Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) South-South Cooperation Trust Fund, implemented the Food Production Enhancement Action, and provided food assistance to and shared agrotech with many countries.” Xi’s statement signals that food security will also feature in China’s UNGA 78 agenda as it emphasizes its leadership and impact in this area, which it could connect to its climate leadership and support for the Global South. It is likely that China will call on the international community to follow suit, touting the benefit of cooperation with existing multilateral organizations.
It is important to remember, however, that China typically eschews overpromising or overcommitting to the international community, and this will not change at UNGA 78. China tends to set achievable targets, avoiding embarrassing shortfalls and reinforcing its perceived legitimacy. As a result, some of China’s goals, especially with respect to climate, are often viewed, perhaps justifiably, as being too lax. On the one hand, this strategy allows China to add these goals to its list of achievements and bolster its image as a climate leader. On the other hand, it does not accelerate the global climate agenda in a truly ambitious way. Beijing’s twofold challenge of geopolitical instability and a domestic imperative to grow its cooling economy will likely dampen the ambition of any climate-related commitments that China makes this year.
